Diebold Threatens Wary Voting Clerk
Diebold Threatens Wary Voting Clerk: "obvious problem here
(Score:5, Insightful)
by rossifer (581396) Alter Relationship on Wednesday March 29, @11:06AM (#15018691)
(Last Journal: Thursday January 06, @01:26PM)
The very idea that the machines can't be inspected by a third party shows just how fragile such systems are.
In my opinion, at least as important is the belief that the proper group to see if the machines are compromised is the manufacturer.
'We've decided we are going have Diebold come and go through these machines and see if they are compromised,' [Comissioner Ira Hatch] said
If the machines can't be verified as uncompromised on voting day by an election staffer at a voting location multiple times throughout the day, that's a huge problem. For the voting commission to accept Diebold's line that 'That's the way it is.' is simply unconscionable.
Slot machines in Nevada can be checked against any number of parameters to make sure that 1) hardware has not been added or replaced, 2) the software has not been altered (from the registered version on file with the NGC) and 3) the settings for the software match the casino's payout statements. The casino can do these checks, the NGC can do these checks, interested public parties can do these checks (with the cooperation of either the casino or the NGC).
Shouldn't we expect at least as much from the recordkeepers of democracy as we expect from a gambling house?"
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buysse (5473) * on March 29, @11:20AM (#15018805)
(http://r00tkit.com/) When you use a Diebold ATM, it prints a paper trail inside the box, and gives you a printed receipt with a transaction number that can be matched to both the internal database and to the paper trail inside. If the printer inside jams, it stops accepting transactions. Detailed information about the inner workings and software are shared with the banks, and all transactions are registered in real-time with a central system (nearly instantaneous over ISDN or similar connection).
When was the last time your bank "forgot" that you took money from an ATM? Do you ever hear of problems like that? No? Why does it happen with a vote?
I've become far more cynical about the process as every recount that's happened has had discrepancies. New, uncertified code is loaded on the machines the day before the election. The code is not available for examination by third parties (yet, a slot machine is.)
Why were exit polls so much more accurate in the days of paper ballots? I find it unlikely that the methodology has gotten that much worse, especially considering that similar districts in the same election have varying margins of error that correlate to the voting system in use at the polling location.
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Why does Diebold design these machines in such a way that they *CAN* be hacked? I think that involving an Operating System and software in the design of such a machine is a critical error. As a computer engineer, I realize that overcomplicating things can lead to errors. DSP's can make hardware extremely cheap, but there are places where analog circuits are cheaper and more realiable! Why hasn't Diebold designed a hardwired electronic circuit or a mechanical system with failsafes such that the machine can't be hacked, and the wrong candidate will not be selected if the machine fails? There are so many places where their current design can and will go wrong. I believe that it's time for these loonies (or preferrably someone else who has more sense) to come up with a more rudimentary and failsafe design!===================
It's also a CONFESSION
(Score:5, Insightful)On the third hand, it is a clear confession from Diebold that third parties can't accurately verify their voting machines and that their voting machines can be rigged.
So any county that thinks it is verifying that the machine isn't rigged by runnig pre-ballot checks is wrong.
They can point to this statement and say "IT ISN'T ENOUGH THAT WE VERIFY IT, BECAUSE DIEBOLD ADMITS THEY CAN BE RIGGED IN WAYS ONLY IT CAN DETECT".
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It's Uncertifiable
(Score:5, Insightful)The claim in previous elections is that it CAN be verified by running a trial ballot on the machines before the election. This is clearly false, since Diebold now asserts that this test will not detect this 'tinkering' you speak of.
Which means that any Diebold 'tinkering' cannot be detected either. Which means the machines can't be certified as accurate.
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Suddenly I don't feel bad my stories are rejected
(Score:5, Funny)===================
Re:What you're missing...
(Score:5, Insightful)
on Wednesday March 29, @12:55PM (#15019611) (http://ewhac.best.vwh.net/ | Last Journal: Saturday August 18, @09:28PM)
What everyone is missing is that this clerk allowed unauthorized access to the machine, regardless of the intent. He went beyond the scope of his responsibility and did not follow the chain of command.
No, we're not missing that at all. It seems evident that the Chain of Command was either dazzled, baffled, or bribed into accepting these faulty machines from an ethically deficient corporation, and the only way the integrity of the voting process could be preserved was to solicit an independent examination into the machines' trustworthiness.
That the Chain of Command is now throwing a hissy fit about "warranty violations" serves only to illustrate that they are paying attention to the wrong things. Of course you independently test the machines. When you're dealing with something this important, you never believe the four-color glossies; you acquire your own facts and test stuff.
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posted by USSSlavebation @ 3/30/2006 03:41:00 pm
0 comments
What I would like to know...
(Score:5, Interesting)